Blanche v. Muk Choi Lau609 U.S. ___ (2026)
布兰奇诉刘木才案 609 U.S. ___ (2026)

Case Name: Blanche v. Muk Choi Lau, 609 U.S. ___ (2026)

Court: Supreme Court of the United States

Decision Date: June 23, 2026

Vote: 6–3

Majority Opinion: Justice Clarence Thomas

Dissenting Opinion: Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan)

审理法院：美国联邦最高法院

判决日期： 2026年6月23日

表决结果： 6比3

多数意见撰写人：大法官克拉伦斯·托马斯

异议意见撰写人：大法官凯坦吉·布朗·杰克逊（索托马约尔大法官和卡根大法官加入）

Background

Muk Choi Lau, a native and citizen of China, became a lawful permanent resident (LPR) of the United States on September 7, 2007. On May 7, 2012, he was charged in New Jersey with third-degree trademark counterfeiting. While that charge was pending, Lau traveled abroad for a brief period. Upon returning to the United States on June 15, 2012, he presented himself at John F. Kennedy International Airport as a returning LPR.

Because of his pending criminal charge, immigration authorities declined to admit him outright and instead paroled him into the country under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). In June 2013, Lau pleaded guilty to the counterfeiting charge and received two years’ probation.

In March 2014, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against Lau, charging him with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Lau argued that he should not have been treated as an “arriving alien” at the time of reentry based solely on a then-pending, unproven charge.

The immigration judge rejected Lau’s claims and ordered removal in 2018. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed in 2021. Lau petitioned for review, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in his favor in 2025, holding that DHS erred in treating Lau as inadmissible based solely on unproven allegations at the time of reentry.

案件背景

刘木才（Muk Choi Lau）为中国公民，于2007年9月7日成为美国合法永久居民（绿卡持有人）。2012年5月7日，他在新泽西州被指控犯有三级商标假冒罪。在该指控待审期间，刘短暂离开美国。2012年6月15日返回时，他在约翰·F·肯尼迪国际机场以返美绿卡持有人身份入境。

由于刘有未决刑事指控，移民当局未直接准许其入境，而是依据《美国法典》第8编第1182(d)(5)(A)条将其假释入境。2013年6月，刘对假冒指控认罪，被判两年缓刑。

2014年3月，国土安全部对刘启动驱逐程序，依据《美国法典》第8编第1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)条，以刘被判犯有涉及道德败坏罪行为由指控其不可入境。刘主张，仅凭当时尚未证实的未决指控，他不应在重新入境时被视为“入境外国人”。

移民法官驳回了刘的主张，于2018年下令将其驱逐。移民上诉委员会于2021年维持该决定。刘提请复审，联邦第二巡回上诉法院于2025年作出对其有利的裁决，认定国土安全部仅凭重新入境时未经证实的指控即认定刘不可入境，属于法律错误。

Legal Question

Whether, to remove a lawful permanent resident who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, the government must prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the LPR’s last reentry into the United States.

法律争议

在驱逐一名犯有《美国法典》第8编第1182(a)(2)条所列罪行并被假释入境的合法永久居民时，政府是否必须证明其在居民最后一次重新入境时已掌握明确且令人信服的证据？

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s ruling, holding that border officers are not required to possess “clear and convincing evidence” that a returning LPR committed a disqualifying offense before paroling the individual rather than admitting them in the usual course.

The majority made three key points:

(1) No border-level evidentiary burden:Requiring frontline CBP officers to possess clear and convincing evidence of a disqualifying offense during routine border inspections would be impractical and inconsistent with the statutory framework.

(2) Evidentiary standards apply later:Heightened evidentiary standards belong in adversarial removal proceedings before an immigration judge, not during an initial inspection at a port of entry.

(3) Burden in removal proceedings remains:Once formal removal proceedings begin, the government must still prove by clear and convincing evidence that the noncitizen falls within one of the statutory exceptions. However, that proof need not be available to CBP officers at the moment of inspection.

Justice Thomas wrote that “border officers did not have the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Lau had committed a crime involving moral turpitude”.

Justice Jackson dissented, writing that the decision to place Lau on immigration parole effectively sentenced him to “immigration limbo” before he had been convicted of any crime. “I worry that the Court has now handed the Government a massive blank check,” she wrote.

最高法院判决

最高法院推翻了下级法院的裁决，认定边境官员在决定对返美绿卡持有人予以假释而非正常准许入境时，无须掌握“明确且令人信服的证据”证明该居民犯有丧失资格的罪行。

多数意见阐述了三个关键要点：

(1) 边境层面无举证责任要求：要求一线边境官员在日常边境检查中掌握明确且令人信服的证据，既不切实际，也与法定框架不符。

(2)证据标准适用于后续程序：较高的证据标准适用于移民法官主持的对抗性驱逐程序，而非入境口岸的初步检查。

(3)驱逐程序中的举证责任不变：一旦正式启动驱逐程序，政府仍需以明确且令人信服的证据证明该非公民属于法定例外情形。但该证明无须在检查时即为边境官员所掌握。

托马斯大法官写道：“边境官员无须承担以明确且令人信服的证据证明刘犯有涉及道德败坏罪行的责任”。

杰克逊大法官在异议意见中指出，将刘置于移民假释状态，相当于在其未被定罪之前即将其置于“移民灰色地带”。“我担心法院现在给了政府一张巨大的空白支票，”她写道。

Impact

The ruling primarily affects LPRs with unresolved criminal or other inadmissibility issues who travel internationally. Returning permanent residents who are flagged due to unresolved criminal matters may be treated as “arriving aliens” rather than as previously admitted LPRs, potentially disrupting employment authorization and other benefits tied to permanent resident status.

案件影响

该裁决主要影响存在未决刑事或其他不可入境问题的、有国际旅行计划的绿卡持有人。因未决刑事问题而被标记的返美永久居民可能被视作“入境外国人”而非已获准入境的绿卡持有人，从而可能影响其工作许可及其他与永久居民身份相关的权益。